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TESTING — AND MOSTLY REJECTING — THE FOLK WISDOM OF
THE EFFECTIVE APPELLATE BRIEF†
STEVEN R. MORRISON* AND BRIAN DARBY**
ABSTRACT
There is a great deal of folk wisdom regarding how to draft an effective
appellate brief. Judges and lawyers offer advice that briefs should be short,
should present relatively few issues, should always be followed by a reply brief,
and so forth. There is little doubt that aspiring appellate advocates, law
professors who teach writing, appellate court clerks, and appellate court judges
look to this folk wisdom to learn how to write effective appellate briefs, teach
the skill, and evaluate, by proxies, which briefs are likely to be the best.
But this folk wisdom has never been empirically tested. We do so in this
article. We examined all cases in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that
resulted in an opinion in 2016, coding for many of the variables that the folk
wisdom discusses. We also coded for the type of holding and type of opinion that
the Eighth Circuit published as our dependent variables.
The result was that much of the folk wisdom, in our dataset at least, was not
statistically supported. We did, however, find some statistically significant
correlations between our independent and dependent variables. These results
will help to inform the attorneys, professors, clerks, and courts that work with
appellate briefs every day. It will help these people draft, teach, and evaluate
appellate briefs. It will also further the inquiry into effective appellate writing
by calling into question the accepted folk wisdom, and thus opening the doors
for other avenues of research.

† Copyright 2018, Steven R. Morrison & Brian Darby.
* Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. Thanks go to UND Law students
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INTRODUCTION
There is a lot of folk wisdom about the characteristics of successful appellate
briefs. It is said that shorter briefs and fewer issues lead to greater appellate
success. Bryan Garner has recommended that issue statements not exceed
seventy-five words. Given his recommendation to include a major premise,
minor premise, and conclusion, it would appear that his ideal issue statement
isn’t fewer than, say, twenty-five words. Some claim that simple, short
arguments are more effective than longer ones. Many attorneys wonder whether
participating in oral argument and submitting reply briefs have any effect on
appeal success. And appellate cases are supposed to be driven by the law, not
the factual complexities of a case. Until now, this folk wisdom has remained
empirically untested. In this article, we set forth the results of a quantitative
analysis of appellate briefs we performed that tests much of this folk wisdom.
Our data set is all 1,123 cases that resulted in a decision by the Eighth Circuit
in 2016. We chose this data set because it was the most recent full calendar year
as of the start of this research, and because we reside in and one of us practices
in the Eighth Circuit. There are at least three potential representativeness
problems with this dataset. First, it is a snapshot of only one year. 2016 in the
Eighth Circuit may have been an anomaly. Second, it surveys only the Eighth
Circuit, which may value aspects of appellate briefs differently than other federal
circuits. Third, it surveys only a federal court. State appellate courts (whether
intermediate or supreme) may treat appellate briefs differently.
Nevertheless, we believe that this dataset can provide at least a basis for
understanding when, if ever, the anecdotal folk wisdom about appellate briefs is
valid. Certainly this dataset will say much about the Eighth Circuit today. It will,
perhaps, say less about other circuits and the Eighth Circuit in the distant past.
And it may say even less about appellate briefs in state courts.
This is primarily a descriptive project. It pulls its data from appellants’
original briefs, the Eighth Circuit’s general docket sheet for each case, and the
Eighth Circuit’s judgment and opinion in these cases. It compiles data on most
things in these briefs that are readily quantifiable and likely to be relevant, given
the prevailing folk wisdom. It also includes whether oral argument was held,
whether the appellant filed a reply brief, what type of opinion the Eighth Circuit
issued, and the holding of that opinion.
This article considers only appellants’ briefs, not appellee’s response briefs.
Where there is a cross-appeal, this article considers only the briefs of the first
appellant. This approach is necessary to ensure continuity of coding from case
to case, and it is appropriate because most of the time the appellee wins the
appeal. It is usually not difficult for the appellee to convince the Eighth Circuit
that a lower court got it right. Since this article seeks to uncover the
characteristics of effective briefs, it makes sense to focus on the briefs that the
Eighth Circuit, given its large affirmance rate, treats with the most skepticism.
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This article takes the following route. Part I provides a review of the relevant
literature. In broad strokes, this section shows that there is a substantial body of
empirical scholarship on appellate courts and much folk wisdom regarding the
variables to be evaluated in this article, but no empirical data to support that folk
wisdom. Part II describes the empirical study that we performed, detailing the
theories to be tested, null and alternative hypotheses, target and sample
population of cases, methodology for collecting data, identification of data
sources, and variables and their codes. Part III reports the results of this study
and describes any significant relationship between variables and case outcome.
The conclusion departs from this article’s descriptive bent to hypothesize why
these significant relationships exist and what these relationships might mean.
The conclusion also plots a course for future research.
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is a good deal of empirical scholarship on appeals. It includes studies
on appellate treatment of jury verdicts1; the effect of judges’ complex social
background on their decisionmaking2; the impact of trial courts’ deference to
appellate rulings3; the impact of judges’ policy preferences and strategic
calculations in an en banc setting4; a general empirical description of criminal
appeals’ outcomes5; judicial activism6; the harmless error doctrine in criminal
appeals7; the effect of mental heuristics and “cognitive illusions” on judicial
decisionmaking8; the effect of judges’ political ideologies9; the effect of “pathosbased” storytelling on appellate decisionmaking10; and others.11
1. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’
Advantage, 3 AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 125 (2001).
2. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
3. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV.
643 (2005).
4. Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998).
5. Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 825 (2009).
6. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism
in the Federal Courts, 105 N.W. L. REV. 1 (2011).
7. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD., 161 (2001).
8. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780, 784 (2001).
9. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133 (2010).
10. Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging By the Numbers: An Empirical Study of The Power of Story,
7 J ALWD 2 (2010).
11. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
(2002); Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Study
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While these studies provide insight into how courts of appeals operate,12
they have never considered the effect of the appellate brief itself. This is an
important gap because, on appeal, parties usually have only two avenues of
communication to the courts: the briefs they draft, and the short oral arguments
that build upon those briefs. The empirical scholarship on appeals offers little
insight into how to best draft this most important of appellate documents.
That is not to say that the literature is short on opinions. Folk wisdom about
how to draft an appellate brief abounds:
Number of sources. Judge Richard Posner suggests that citing fewer sources
is better than citing more sources, because lawyers should not “beat [judges]
over the head with statutory language and precedent.”13 A set of law clerks for
the South Carolina Court of Appeals offered that appellate lawyers should
“avoid lengthy examples, voluminous case law without explanatory
parentheticals, and extraneous information.”14 Belinda I. Mathie recommends
that lawyers “[c]hoose [their] citations with care . . . Bogging down your brief
with extraneous and unnecessary citations creates more work than necessary for
the court and reduces your room to make substantive arguments.”15 And a

2012 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2012); Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.,
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=789544.; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J.
2155 (1998); Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1457 (2003); Sue Davis, Susan Haire, & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the
U.S. Court of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993); Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close
Cases: Some Evidence From the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1083 (2006); Chris
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Into the “Affirmance
Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (2005); Jonathan P.
Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 167
(2013); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation Into Appellate
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745 (2008).
12. But see Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895,
1899-1900 (2009) (questioning the value of empirical legal studies “to understand the effect of
extralegal factors on appellate decisionmaking”).
13. Hon. Richard A. Posner, Effective Appellate Brief Writing, http://apps.americanbar.org/lit
igation/litigationnews/trial_skills/appellate-brief-writing-posner.html [https://perma.cc/Y3F5-NT
HR] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
14. H. Bruce Williams, Top Ten Tips for Appellate Brief Writing from Appellate Law Clerks:
“Help Us Help You”, LCBA CLE, Nov. 1, 2012, available at http://www.lex-co.sc.gov/depart
ments/DeptIQ/mie/Documents/OrderWritingTips.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZA-HX5H].
15. Belinda I. Mathie, Writing Appellate Briefs, for Young Lawyers, 29 APP. PRAC. 1, 2 (2010),
available at https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/22105_Mathie_AppellatePractice_WritingBriefs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE5A-2N54].
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former Federal Circuit law clerk recommends avoiding “long string cites of
cases.”16
Number of issues. Judge Jane R. Roth and one of her former law clerks
advise that lawyers “should limit the number of issues . . . a limited set of issues
presenting only viable arguments is best . . . Occasionally, an advocate will
present ten or fifteen issues in her brief. This is an automatic warning flag that
the advocate does not understand what the case is about or that she hopes to hide
the weakness of the appeal under a flurry of words.”17 Similarly, Belinda I.
Mathie advises that lawyers “be selective about the issues [they] present on
appeal . . . [and] not devote time or space to discussion of marginal points.”18 It
has also been suggested that “[t]here is such a thing as too many issues.”19 Judge
Ruggero Aldisert observed that lawyers who present more than three issues
suffer a credibility loss, and that when a lawyers presents eight issues, there is a
“strong presumption that no point is worthwhile.”20 Other judges seem to find a
red line at three issues: more than that, and these judges view the brief with
suspicion.21 Judge S. Jay Plager of the Federal Circuit offered that he could not
remember sitting on any case that was decided by the “ninth or tenth ‘Question
Presented,’ and in part that may be because [he couldn’t] ever remember having
read that far into the ‘Question Presented.’”22 And a former Federal Circuit clerk
observed that the statement of the issues is “rarely helpful” because lawyers
“present too many issues and the issues are too long and too argumentative.”23
Words per issue. Where this Federal Circuit clerk recommended that each
issue should be short (“a sentence or two”24), Bryan Garner recommends that
issue statements should not exceed seventy-five words.25 He proposes a major
premise-minor premise-conclusion organization, which is usually feasible
within the seventy-five-word limit. The Georgetown University Law Center
Writing Center recommends issues of one sentence, which should be no longer
16. Rachel Clark Hughey, Effective Appellate Advocacy before the Federal Circuit: A Former
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 401, 411 (2010).
17. Hon. Jane R. Roth & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing an Effective
Appellate Brief, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 454 (2010).
18. Mathie, supra note 15, at 1.
19. Robert B. Dubose, Appellate Brief Writing: Making a Brief Helpful and Persuasive,
STATE BAR COLLEGE SUMMER SCHOOL 2007, at 4, available at http://www.adjtlaw.com/assets/
Brief%20Writing.Dubose.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7EE-QBUA].
20. JUDGE RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 120 (rev. 1st ed. 1996).
21. Hughey, supra note 16, at 417.
22. S. Jay Plager, J., Remarks, Sixteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 193 F.R.D. 263, 277 (1999).
23. Hughey, supra note 16, at 408.
24. Id. at 409.
25. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL
AND APPELLATE COURTS 104 (3d ed. 2014).
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than three to four lines.26 Assuming each line contains an average of thirteen
words, Georgetown recommends issues of no more than fifty-two words. The
examples that it provides suggests that issue statements much shorter than that
are appropriate.27
Statement of facts. It is common advice that the statement of facts should
include all of the legally relevant facts, even if they do not favor one’s client,28
and that the statement of facts should tell an interesting and complete story.29 At
the same time, a lawyer should not waste space.30 Thus, one should “think about
proportion — the Statement of Facts generally should not take up too much of
[a lawyer’s] allotted space.”31 Extremely short statements of facts, therefore,
may be less effective, as might very long statements of facts. A statement of
some middling length should be ideal.
Overall length of brief. Bryan Garner, among his many words of wisdom,
suggests, in many ways, that shorter legal writing is better.32 Judge Richard
Posner is more pointed, arguing that briefs should be just that — brief.33 Judge
Daniel M. Friedman wrote that “[t]he shorter the brief, the more effective it will
be.”34 Federal Circuit Judge Alvin A. Schall wrote that briefs should “be as
concise as possible.”35 And the former Federal Circuit clerk reported that
“almost every opening brief in a patent case approached the word limit, which
seemed to [her] to indicate that attorneys sometimes forget that their case is not
the only appeal before the court.”36
Reply briefs. Posner also recommends that attorneys “not forgo the
opportunity to file a reply brief. The appellee is bound to make some halfway
decent points in rebuttal . . . Don’t let him or her have the last word.”37 Another
26. The Writing Center, Georgetown University Law Center, Persuasive Issue Statements, at
4 (2015), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GeenbergWeingast-Issue-Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5SN-A3RJ].
27. Id. at 8.
28. Hon. Jane R. Roth & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing an Effective
Appellate Brief, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 445 (2010); The Writing Center, Georgetown
University Law Center, Writing a Statement of Facts in an Appellate Brief, at 2 (2014), available
at
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/StatementofFactsinaBriefFi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV73-6XLD].
29. Roth & Walia, supra note 28; The Writing Center, supra note 28, at 3–4.
30. The Writing Center, supra note 28, at 4.
31. Id. at 4.
32. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH, 24, 27–29, 50, 78, 146, 147
(2013) (arguing for omitting needless words, simplifying wordy phrases, summarizing rather than
overparticularizing, keeping sentences short, and creating ample white space on the page).
33. Posner, supra note 13.
34. Daniel M. Friedman, Winning on Appeal, 9 LITIG. 15, 18 (Spring 1983).
35. Alvin A. Schall, Remarks, Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 153 F.R.D. 177, 196 (1993).
36. Hughey, supra note 16, at 415.
37. Posner, supra note 13.
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commentator has suggested that while reply briefs are usually optional, “there
are very few — if any — circumstances that justify the decision to forgo the
chance to file a reply.”38
Oral arguments. A former Eighth Circuit law clerk argued that “[o]ral
argument can be critical, but only in a very small percentage of cases,”39 and
that for all cases but a few, “oral argument should not be granted at all.”40 A
former Federal Circuit law clerk, however, suggested, that “[w]hile the brief is
very important, the oral argument still matters.”41 A number of judges on the
Federal Circuit, as reported by this law clerk, expressed that oral argument
matters to them.42 They do not, however, say that it unilaterally helps or hurts
the appellant; rather, it can serve to clarify the case for them.
These experienced judges, clerks, and lawyers certainly have a wealth of
personal experience with effective appellate brief writing, but it is possible that
their views are clouded by their own personal preferences, which may have little
to do with whether following their advice will demonstrably lead to greater
success. This article aims to test these claims, to determine whether they do, in
fact, produce more “effective” briefs — by which we mean briefs that result in
the reviewing court’s opinion and holding being more favorable to the appellant
who has submitted the brief.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND METHODS
A.

Our Study’s Central Question and Eight Research Hypotheses

Our study aims to test the folk wisdom around successful appellate briefs.
We therefore identified the quantifiable aspects of briefs that the folk wisdom
would impact, coded for those aspects, and compared this data to the coded data
for the Eighth Circuit’s holding and opinion. As the aim of our study is
multifaceted, so too are the theories. The literature suggests eight hypotheses:
 A brief with fewer cited sources, all other things being equal, should be
more successful than a brief with more cited sources;
 A brief with fewer issues, all other things being equal, should be more
successful than a brief with more issues;

38. Richard C. Kraus, Crafting an Influential and Effective Reply Brief, APP. ISSUES, ABA
COUNSEL OF APPELLATE LAWYERS, at 1 (Summer 2012), available at https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate_issues/2012sum_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHZ4-Q9
EV].
39. Michael Duvall, When Is Oral Argument Important? A Judicial Clerk’s View of the
Debate, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 121, 130 (2007).
40. Id. at 121.
41. Hughey, supra note 16, at 426.
42. Id. at 426-27.
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 There is a significant drop in success between briefs that present three
issues and briefs that present four issues;
 Briefs that present issues that are set forth in more than seventy-five
words, all other things being equal, should be less successful than briefs
that present issues that are set forth in seventy-five words or less;
 The success rate of briefs, evaluated against the length of the briefs’
statement of the case, will appear as something of a bell curve, where the
highest success rate is found somewhere between the briefs with the
shortest and longest statements of the case;
 A brief that is, overall, shorter, all other things being equal, should be
more successful than a brief that is, overall, longer;
 An appellant who files a reply brief should, all other things being equal,
be more successful than an appellant who does not file a reply brief; and
 Holding an oral argument should, all other things being equal, benefit the
success of an appellant brief.
In each case, the null hypothesis is that each feature of the brief has no effect on
the success of an appellant brief.
B.

Study Design

Variables
We surveyed all 1,123 cases that resulted in a decision by the Eighth Circuit
in 2016. We first compiled a list of most of the variables in an appellant’s
original brief that are readily quantifiable and that appear in the literature as
relevant to a brief’s effectiveness. We do not, therefore, code for an issue’s
standard of review, the legal basis for an issue, whether an appellant must show
prejudice, and so forth. These are substantive aspects of an appeal that
sometimes cannot be easily discerned or quantified. We also did not code for
many things that other researchers have covered. The U.S. Appeals Courts
Database, for example, codes for type of case (criminal, constitutional, etc.),
whether a panel or en banc court heard the case, and many others.43 The Supreme
Court database is similarly wide-ranging.44 We cover ground that has not yet
been covered by these databases or any other project.
These codes and their variable are available in the codebook, found below
in Appendix A. There are three dependent variables and nine independent
variables, plus one identification variable (CASENUM, which is the Eighth
Circuit’s assigned case number, e.g. 16-1907).
43. U.S. Appeals Courts Database, THE JUD. RES. INITIATIVE AT THE U. OF S.C.,
http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm [https://perma.cc/9L2V-BUXP].
44. The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. LAW, http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/
[https://perma.cc/H2QK-HFPR].
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The primary dependent variable in this study is HOLDING, which reflects
the “success” of an appellant’s original brief based on eleven possible outcomes
taken from the Appellate Court Database: (0) Stay, petition, or motion grants,
(1) Affirmed, or affirmed and petition denied, (2) Reversed (including reversed
and vacated), (3) Reversed and remanded (or just remanded), (4) Vacated and
remanded (also set aside and remanded, or modified and remanded), (5)
Affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified, or affirmed and modified),
(6) Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, or affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded, (7) Vacated, (8) Petition denied or appeal dismissed, (9)
Certification to another court, and (10) Not ascertained.45 From these data, a
ranked response variable HOLDINGRANK was computed as (from most to
least “successful,”): (1) HOLDING of 2, 3, 4, or 7; (2) HOLDING of 5 or 6; and
(3) HOLDING of 1 or 8. Thus, to be clear, the ten HOLDING categories have
been reduced to three HOLDINGRANK categories.
The OPINION is also a dependent variable because it reflects an appellant’s
“success,” albeit more weakly than HOLDING because it expresses how the
court reached its conclusion, rather than the conclusion itself. OPINION
expresses, possibly, the strength of the HOLDING. Of six possible outcomes,
the dataset saw five of them realized. The strength of the court’s expression of
its OPINION, from strongest to weakest, is (1) per curiam; (2) signed,
unanimous; (3) signed, with concurrence; (4) signed, with concurrence and
dissent; and (5) signed, with dissent. OPINIONRANK is the ranked response
variable and has the same values as OPINION.
Thus, the HOLDING and OPINION dependent variables combine to
produce twenty potential outcomes (with eleven different ranks), analyzed as
OUTCOMERANK. From most successful to least successful, they are:
1 = Per curiam reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated;
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=1 and
HOLDINGRANK=1 [thus a HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7]).
2 = Signed, unanimous reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated;
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=2 and
HOLDINGRANK=1);
3 = Signed, with concurrence reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated;
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=3 and
HOLDINGRANK=1);
4 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent reversed; reversed and
remanded/vacated; vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded
(where OPINION=6 and HOLDINGRANK=1);

45. HOLDINGS 0, 9, and 10 did not occur in our dataset.
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5 = Signed, with dissent reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated;
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=4 and
HOLDINGRANK=1);
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part and reversed in part (where OPINION=1
and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=2 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=3 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part and reversed in
part (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=4 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (where
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=6);
7 = Signed, with dissent affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDINGRANK=3 [thus a HOLDING=1
or 8]);
8 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmance, petition denied, or
appeal dismissed (where OPINION=6 and HOLDINGRANK=3);
9 = Signed, with concurrence affirmance, petition denied, or appeal
dismissed (where OPINION=3 and HOLDINGRANK=3);
10 = Signed, unanimous affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDINGRANK=3);
11 = Per curiam affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed (where
OPINION=1 and HOLDINGRANK=3).
Because our study is a purely quantitative one that examines appellate briefs,
there are two weaknesses that should be noted here. First, for cases that result in
a partial affirmance and partial reversal, we do not examine the nature of that
split decision. We cannot, therefore, discern the variable rates of “success”
among these decisions. Thus, the ten outcomes above with a HOLDING of 5 or
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6 produce the same OUTCOMERANK of 6. Second, while an appellant
normally hopes that the court will reverse/vacate or remand the case, this is not
a uniformly positive outcome. The court may reverse/vacate or remand a case
for reasons other than those for which the appellant requested these outcomes.
Our study does not account for those (probably relatively rare) cases.
There are nine independent variables, excluding CASENUM, which is an
identification variable and simply lists the case number assigned to the case by
the Eighth Circuit.
NUMSCRS lists the number of sources cited in the appellant’s table of
authorities (integers from 2 to 133, median=29). This study examines only an
appellant’s original briefs that were written by lawyers, so if a brief is
unavailable or non-existent, “Briefs unavail” is listed in the NUMSCRS column
of the Excel spreadsheet on which we compiled the data; if a brief is pro se, “Pro
se” is listed; and if a brief is an Anders brief (which is a required brief written in
a criminal appeal when the attorney believes there are no viable issues to be
argued), “Anders” is listed. Eliminating these cases from the original dataset
resulted in our edited, operative dataset of 737 cases.
NUMISSUES lists the number of issues stated in the statement of the issues
(integers from 1 to 19, median=2).
WDSPERISS lists the average number of words per issue, as listed in
NUMISSUES (numbers from 6 to 320, median=30.5).
STMTPAGES lists the number of pages that the statement of the case covers
(integers from 0 to 39, median=5). This number is calculated by subtracting the
page on which the statement begins from the page on which it ends. For
statements that appear on only one page, therefore, 0 is entered.
ARGPAGES lists the number of pages that the argument section covers
(integers from 2 to 64, median=14). It is calculated the same way that
STMTPAGES is calculated.
PGPERARG lists the average number of argument pages per issue, taken by
dividing ARGPAGES by NUMISSUES (numbers from 0.375 to 52, median=7).
TOTALWDS lists the number of words in the entire brief, as reported by
counsel in the brief’s certificate of compliance (integers from 1150 to 20572,
median=5930). Where the length is reported by pages, that number is multiplied
by 230 to produce an approximate word count. Where the length is reported by
line numbers, that number is multiplied by 13 to produce an approximate word
count. Where the brief itself contain no indication of its length, the Eighth
Circuit’s general docket lists the brief’s number of pages; that number is
multiplied by 230 to produce an approximate word count.
REPLY lists whether or not a reply brief was filed (No=0, Yes=1).
ARGHELD lists whether or not an oral argument was held (No=0, Yes=1).
This does not differentiate between cases in which the appellant requested or did
not request an oral argument, nor does it differentiate between cases in which
the court initially declined to screen for an oral argument or screened for or
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scheduled an oral argument but later changed the case’s status to a no-argument
case. This variable simply lists whether the argument was held or not.
OPINION lists the type of opinion the court issued: per curiam; signed,
unanimous; signed, with concurrence; signed, with dissent; or signed, with
concurrence and dissent (whether one judge concurred and a separate judge
dissented or one judge concurred in part and dissented in part).
HOLDING lists the court’s disposition of the case, including, among others:
affirmed; reversed; affirmed in part and reversed in part; and so forth.
Statistical Analysis
Data exploration46 was conducted with a scatterplot matrix of the seven
numerical explanatory variables (NUMSRCS, NUMISSUES, WDSPERISS,
STMTPAGES, ARGPAGES, PGPERARG, and TOTALWDS) along with
contingency tables of the two categorical dependent variables (REPLY and
ARGHELD). We also fit each of the seven numerical explanatory variables to
one of three statistical distributions: log-normal, negative binomial, and gamma,
using Pearson’s χ2 / DF as a measure of goodness-of-fit.
Each of the ranked response variables (HOLDINGRANK,
OPINIONRANK, and OUTCOMERANK) were analyzed with a generalized
linear model47 with the multinomial ranked responses linked as cumulative
logit/proportional odds and the fixed (explanatory) variables determined by
stepwise selection. The response variables HOLDINGRANK and
OUTCOMERANK are ordinal in the sense that they are coded so that lower
values are considered “more successful,” (or “stronger”, in the case of
OPINIONRANK). This means that the multinomial cumulative logit link
models the log-odds ratio of accomplishing a lower-valued response variable,
relative to the highest (“worst”) possible outcome. Formally, this proportional
cumulative logit model can be described as:
…

Where Y is the response variable, i is the ranked value of the response
variable, β0i is the intercept associated with rank i, and βj is the parameter
estimate associated with explanatory variable xj. Thus, the model can be read as
“the log-odds-ratio of observing a response of rank i or lower is a function of its
intercept log-odds ratio plus the sum of the relevant parameter estimates times
their respective explanatory variables.” The intercept parameters are estimated
for each ranked level of the response variable except for the highest (reference)
rank, and the estimated value represents the log-odds ratio of observing that
particular rank (or lower) relative to the highest (reference) rank, given all other
46. Alain F. Zuur, Elana N. Ieno & Chris S. Elphick. A protocol for data exploration to avoid
common statistical problems. 1 METHODS IN ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 3 (2010).
47. WALTER STROUP, GENERALIZED LINEAR MIXED MODELS, 398–404 (2012).
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fixed effects are set at zero (i.e. no argument, no reply, and ln(1)=0 sources,
issues, pages, etc. . . .). The fixed effect parameters represent the increased logodds ratio of observing a lower-ranked response for every one unit increase of
the fixed effect. In the case of the categorical predictors REPLY and ARGHELD
(which are coded 0 or 1), a positive parameter estimate would suggest that the
presence of that variable (e.g. holding a reply or argument) is associated with an
increased probability of having a lower (or “better”) ranking. Similarly, a
positive parameter estimate for a numerical dependent variable indicates that
each loge-fold increase in the dependent variable (or 2.7x increase on the original
scale, because they were loge-transformed) is associated with an increased logodds ratio of having a lower-ranked (“better”) response. We also include the
squares of each numerical variable, such as lnNUMSRCS2, which allows the
model to test for quadratic, or curvilinear, effects. The presence of both a linear
term (whose parameter estimate we’ll call α) and also its corresponding
quadratic term (whose parameter estimate we’ll call β) would suggest that the
log-odds relationship is curved up or down and has some intermediate apex. The
location of the apex, along the log-transformed explanatory variable, should be
at -α/2β (or, at exp(-α/2β) along the original, non-transformed explanatory
variable) and the log-odds curve should open up if β is positive, and down if β
is negative.
Because of the possibility of multicollinearity between the explanatory
variables, the cumulative logit models were constructed in a stepwise selection
using Akaike Information Criterion as the stop criteria. Akaike Information
Criterion (“AIC”) is a likelihood-based information-theoretic index that
describes the quality (or “information content”) of a model, after penalty for the
number of parameters in the model, with lower values indicating a better fit. In
stepwise selection, the model begins with no fixed effects and computes only
the intercepts for each ranked response. At each subsequent iteration of the
algorithm, the model takes on the best most explanatory variable, but only if that
variable reduces (improves) the AIC score.48 The stepwise model also has the
option to exclude a previously included variable if removal improves the AIC
score. This stepwise selection approach is designed to select only the
explanatory variables that best explain the response variable and is a partial
control on multicollinearity because the AIC (like other information-theoretic
indices) includes a penalty for excessive number of parameters without
improvement in fit. For example, if variables A and B are highly correlated with
C, it would be preferable to select a model with only the one best (most
explanatory) variable, if they are indeed redundant. In this case, it would be
conceivable for the stepwise model to include variable A in the first round,
48. The variables that the model has to choose from includes both categorical variables, all of
the log-transformed numerical variables, and also squares of all of the log-transformed numerical
variables to account for possible quadratic effects.
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include variable B in the second round, C in the third round, and then remove
variable A and B in subsequent rounds if they essentially contain comparable
information to variable C. This stepwise model selection was conducted for each
of the ranked response variables using PROC HPGENSELECT (Statistical
Analysis Software, SAS Institute, Cary, NC). McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was
computed as R2M = 1-(LogLM/LogLN) where LogLM is the log-likelihood of the
final model and LogLN is the log-likelihood of the null model (intercepts only,
no fixed effects). Here is the analyzed procedure of our stepwise selection:
TABLE 1: PROCEDURE OF STEPWISE SELECTION
Selection Details for HOLDINGRANK
Effects
Step

Description

In Model

Chi-Square

0

Initial Model

1

1

ARGHELD entered

2

31.1292

2

lnNUMSRCS entered

3

3

lnNUMSRCS2 entered

4

2

Pseudo-R

Pr > ChiSq

-2 LogL

AIC

866.962

870.962

<.0001

834.547

840.547

9.0245

0.0027

825.243

833.243

4.4556

0.0348

819.791

829.791

0.054

McFadden

Selection Details for OPINIONRANK
Effects
Step

Description

In Model

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

-2 LogL

AIC

1424.150

1432.150

0

Initial Model

1

1

ARGHELD entered

2

243.9218

<.0001

1150.664

1160.664

2

REPLY entered

3

15.1409

<.0001

1135.333

1147.333

3

lnARGPAGES entered

4

3.9394

0.0472

1131.375 1145.375

4

lnARGPAGES2

5

7.3057

0.0069

1123.691 1139.691

entered
Pseudo-R2McFadden

0.211
Selection Details for OUTCOMERANK
Effects

Step

Description

In Model

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

-2 LogL

AIC

0

Initial Model

1

1

ARGHELD entered

2

191.4836

<.0001

1948.165 1968.165

2

REPLY entered

3

24.0361

<.0001

1923.768 1945.768

3

lnNUMSRCS entered

4

8.5557

0.0034

1915.167 1939.167

4

lnNUMSRCS2 entered

5

7.1093

0.0077

1907.283 1933.283

Pseudo-R2McFadden

2154.634 2172.634

0.115
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III. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
Based on this data analysis, we made three initial determinations.
First, all of the seven numerical dependent variables were positively skewed
in their frequency distribution and would therefore be more appropriately
modeled through natural-log transformations so that they approximated a normal
distribution (log-transformed variables now have “ln” in front of the original
variable name).
Second, four numerical dependent variables in particular showed strong
evidence of collinearity (lnNUMSRCS, lnNUMISSUES, lnARGPAGES,
lnTOTALWDS):
FIGURE 1:
lnNUMISSUES

lnARGPAGES

lnTOTALWDS

lnTOTALWDS

lnARGPAGES

lnNUMISSUES

lnNUMSRCS

lnNUMSRCS

Figure 1. Scatterplot matrix between four loge-transformed numeric
variables (lnNUMSRCS = number of sources, lnNUMISSUES = number of
issues, lnARGPAGES = argument pages, and lnTOTALWDS = total words) that
appear to be mutually colinear. Frequency histograms along the diagonal
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illustrate that most variables are approximately normally distributed after logetransformation.
Third, the frequency of REPLY and ARGHELD was not random: briefs
holding an argument also tended to have a reply more often than would be
expected by chance (Fig. 2, χ2 = 130.62, p < 0.0001).
FIGURE 2:

Figure 2. Vertical barchart showing the uneven distribution of cases that did
(=1) or did not (=0) hold an argument (ARGHELD) or reply (REPLY).
All of the integer dependent variables appeared to be drawn from a negative
binomial distribution, with values of Pearson’s χ2 / DF in the range of 1.00 to
1.22.49 The two dependent variables that are ratios (PGPERARG and
WDSPERISS) appeared to be drawn from a gamma distribution but were
somewhat underdispersed (with Pearson’s χ2 / DF values of 0.52 and 0.70,
respectively). The two categorical dependent variables (ARGHELD and
REPLY) were drawn from a binary distribution with a probability of success (π)
= 50.88 and 67.57, respectively. The mean and scale (dispersion) value for these
variables are reported in Table 2:

49. 1.00 is ideal, greater than 2.0 generally suggests poor fit due to overdispersion.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

308

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:291

TABLE 2: MEAN AND SCALE OF NUMERICAL VARIABLES
VARIABLE

DISTRIBUTION

MEAN (µ/π)

SCALE (Φ)

NUMSRCS
NUMISSUES

NEGATIVEBINOMIAL

33.56

0.323

NEGATIVEBINOMIAL

2.37

0.092

WDSPERISS

GAMMA

38.33

0.400

STMTPAGES

NEGATIVEBINOMIAL

6.69

0.562

ARGPAGES

NEGATIVEBINOMIAL

16.94

0.399

PGPERARG

GAMMA

8.35

0.378

TOTALWDS

NEGATIVEBINOMIAL

6705.70

0.315

ARGHELD

BINARY

50.88

NA

REPLY

BINARY

67.57

NA

*For X~NB(µ,Φ) Var(X)=µ+Φµ2
*For X~G(µ,Φ) Var(X)=Φµ2
*For X~B(π) Var(X)= π(1- π)

In the stepwise selection model analysis, we made three additional
determinations.
First, we determined that ARGHELD (p=0.0003), lnNUMSRCS
(p=0.0169), and lnNUMSRCS2 (p=0.0324) were selected as statistically
significant explanatory variables for HOLDINGRANK (Table 3). Thus, holding
an argument was positively associated with increased odds of having a better
HOLDINGRANK (Fig. 3), while the number of sources exhibited a quadratic
relationship with HOLDINGRANK: increasing number of sources was
positively associated with increased odds of having a better HOLDINGRANK
up to approximately exp(-4.62/(2*-0.59))= 50 sources, at which point additional
sources reduced the odds of having a better HOLDINGRANK (Fig. 4). Thus,
the model for predicting the odds ratio of HOLDINGRANK is:

0.85 ∗
4.62 ∗
, where Intercepti is the Intercept
0.59 ∗
from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of HOLDINGRANK.
Second, we determined that REPLY (p=0.0029), ARGHELD (p<0.0001)
lnARGPAGES (p=0.0028), and lnARGPAGES2 (p=0.0073) were selected as
statistically significant explanatory variables for OPINIONRANK (Table 3).
Thus, holding an argument and having a reply were both associated with
decreased odds of having a better OPINIONRANK, while the number of sources
exhibited a quadratic relationship with OPINIONRANK: increasing number of
argument pages was associated with decreased odds of having a stronger
OPINIONRANK up to approximately exp(-2.1/(2*-0.37))= 16.7 pages, at which

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

TESTING — AND MOSTLY REJECTING — THE FOLK WISDOM

309

point additional pages increased the odds of having a weaker OPINIONRANK.
Thus, the model for predicting the odds ratio of OPINIONRANK is:

2.62 ∗
0.60 ∗
, where
2.10 ∗
0.37 ∗
Intercepti is the Intercept from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of
OPINIONRANK.
Third, we determined that REPLY (p=0.0002), ARGHELD (p<0.0001),
lnNUMSRCS (p=0.0027), and lnNUMSRCS2 (p=0.0078) were statistically
significant explanatory variables for OUTCOMERANK (Table 3). Thus,
holding an argument and having a reply was positively associated with increased
odds of having a better OUTCOMERANK, while the number of sources
exhibited a quadratic relationship with OUTCOMERANK: increasing number
of sources was positively associated with increased odds of having a better
OUTCOMERANK up to approximately exp(-2.98/(2*-0.40))= 41.5 sources, at
which point additional sources reduced the odds of having a better
OUTCOMERANK. Thus, the model for predicting the odds ratio of
OUTCOMRANK is:

1.86 ∗
0.69 ∗
2.98
∗
0.40 ∗
, where Intercepti is
the Intercept from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of
OUTCOMERANK.
TABLE 3: FINAL MODELS
Parameter Estimates for HOLDINGRANK
95%

Parameter

HOLDINGRANK

DF

Estimate

Standard

Confidence

Error

Limits

Pr >
Chi-Square

ChiSq

Intercept

1

1

-11.346538

3.347754

-17.90802

-4.78506

11.4873

0.0007

Intercept

2

1

-10.778246

3.346012

-17.33631

-4.22018

10.3763

0.0013

lnNUMSRCS

1

4.623976

1.935096

0.83126

8.41669

5.7099

0.0169

lnNUMSRCS2

1

-0.590204

0.275856

-1.13087

-0.04954

4.5776

0.0324

ARGHELD

1

0.848394

0.233075

0.39158

1.30521

13.2497

0.0003

Parameter Estimates for OPINIONRANK
95%

Parameter

Estimate

Standard

Confidence

Error

Limits

Pr >

OPINIONRANK

DF

Chi-Square

ChiSq

Intercept

1

1

3.260176

0.851913

1.59046

4.92989

14.6451

0.0001

Intercept

2

1

7.677157

0.888989

5.93477

9.41954

74.5775

<.0001

Intercept

3

1

8.036950

0.892237

6.28820

9.78570

81.1376

<.0001
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Parameter Estimates for HOLDINGRANK
95%
Standard
Parameter

Pr >

HOLDINGRANK

DF

Error

Limits

4

1

9.080762

0.912642

7.29202

10.86951

99.0020

<.0001

lnARGPAGES

1

-2.101178

0.704124

-3.48124

-0.72112

8.9049

0.0028

lnARGPAGES2

1

0.373124

0.139169

0.10036

0.64589

7.1882

0.0073

REPLY

1

-0.598983

0.201124

-0.99318

-0.20479

8.8695

0.0029

ARGHELD

1

-2.617620

0.242928

-3.09375

-2.14149

116.1068

<.0001

Intercept

Estimate

Confidence
Chi-Square

ChiSq

Parameter Estimates for OUTCOMERANK
95%

Parameter

Estimate

Standard

Confidence

Error

Limits

Pr >

OUTCOMERANK

DF

Chi-Square

ChiSq

Intercept

1

1

-10.937177

1.657608

-14.18603

-7.68833

43.5358

<.0001

Intercept

2

1

-9.666826

1.646949

-12.89479

-6.43887

34.4514

<.0001

Intercept

3

1

-9.634253

1.646796

-12.86191

-6.40659

34.2260

<.0001

Intercept

5

1

-9.452910

1.645988

-12.67899

-6.22683

32.9820

<.0001

Intercept

6

1

-8.864597

1.644060

-12.08690

-5.64230

29.0725

<.0001

Intercept

7

1

-8.715396

1.643676

-11.93694

-5.49385

28.1153

<.0001

Intercept

8

1

-8.621214

1.643395

-11.84221

-5.40022

27.5203

<.0001

Intercept

9

1

-8.494391

1.643041

-11.71469

-5.27409

26.7281

<.0001

Intercept

10

1

-5.586379

1.628452

-8.77809

-2.39467

11.7682

0.0006

lnNUMSRCS

1

2.981676

0.995666

1.03021

4.93314

8.9680

0.0027

lnNUMSRCS2

1

-0.396322

0.149019

-0.68839

-0.10425

7.0731

0.0078

REPLY

1

0.688649

0.183096

0.32979

1.04751

14.1462

0.0002

ARGHELD

1

1.855179

0.192538

1.47781

2.23255

92.8408

<.0001
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FIGURE 3: HOLDINGRANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD

Figure 3. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the least desirable HOLDINGRANK
(=3, petition affirmed or dismissed) and more of the preferable levels of
HOLDINGRANK (=1&2 petition reversed or remanded in whole or in part).
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Probability of HOLDINGRANK=1 or 2

HOLDINGRANK

FIGURE 4: HOLDINGRANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNNUMSRCS

Figure 4. Scatter plot showing the HOLDINGRANK of cases (vertical axis)
relative to their number of sources (NUMSRCS, horizontal axis, note the logscale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case having an
improved HOLDINGRANK of 1 or 2 (i.e. not 3) as a quadratic function of
lnNUMSRCS; the solid line represents the probabilities for cases that did not
hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the dashed line represents the
probabilities for cases that did hold an argument (ARGHELD=1). In general, the
probability of experiencing a HOLDINGRANK of 1 or 2 (petition reversed or
remanded in whole or in part) is low, but this probability is highest at around
fifty sources.
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Frequency

FIGURE 5: OPINIONRANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD

Figure 5. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the strongest level of OPINIONRANK
(1= per curiam) and more of the weaker levels of OPINIONRANK (4 & 5 =
signed with dissent, whole or in part).
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Probability of OPINIONRANK=1 to 3

OPINIONRANK

FIGURE 6: OPINIONRANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNARGPAGES

Figure 6. Scatter plot showing the OPINIONRANK of cases (vertical axis)
relative to their number of argument pages (ARGPAGES, horizontal axis, note
the log-scale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case
having an OPINIONRANK of 1, 2, or 3 (i.e. not 4 or 5) as a quadratic function
of lnARGPAGES; the solid line (not clearly visible on this graph) represents the
probabilities for cases that did not hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the
dashed line represents the probabilities for cases that did hold an argument
(ARGHELD=1). In general, the probability of experiencing a OPINIONRANK
of 1, 2, or 3 (per curiam, or sign unanimous or with concurrence) is high, but
this probability is lowest/weakest at around 16.7 pages.
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FIGURE 7: OUTCOMERANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD

Figure 7. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the least desireable levels of
OUTCOMERANK and more of the preferable levels of OUTCOMERANK.
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FIGURE 8: OUTCOMERANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNNUMSRCS

Figure 8. Scatter plot showing the OUTCOMERANK of cases (vertical
axis) relative to their number of sources (NUMSRCS, horizontal axis, note the
log-scale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case having
an improved OUTCOMERANK of 1 to 6 as a quadratic function of
lnNUMSRCS; the solid line represents the probabilities for cases that did not
hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the dashed line represents the
probabilities for cases that did hold an argument (ARGHELD=1). In general, the
probability of experiencing a OUTCOMERANK of 1 to 6 is low, but this
probability is highest at around forty-three sources.
CONCLUSION: EXPLANATIONS, THEORIES, THEMES, AND A PATH FORWARD
Our results do not lend strong support for most of the “folk wisdom”
advising against lengthy, wordy briefs with numerous arguments and sources,
but they also do not necessarily refute other recommendations. For example,
holding an argument was associated with more preferable holdings and overall
outcomes (but weaker opinions), and this is in support of Rachel Clark Hughey’s
observation that oral arguments do matter to some judges. Similarly, having a
reply brief was also associated with weaker opinions but more preferable overall
outcomes, in support of the recommendations to always submit a reply brief.
Interestingly, the positive coefficient associated with lnNUMSRCSs leads to the
interpretation that citing a higher number of sources (to a point) is associated
with better odds of obtaining a more preferable holding.
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It must be emphasized here that a major caveat of this study is that the
experimental design is essentially mensurative and not manipulative50 in the
sense that the explanatory variables (ARGHELD, REPLY, NUMSRCS,
ARGPAGES, etc…) were simply measured from actual cases, and not
manipulated experimentally. This bears with it the obvious implication that our
statistical models cannot imply causation, but rather merely association. For
example, we cannot say (in the case of Fig. 4) that cases holding an argument
had a higher probability of more preferable holding because they held an
argument, for we do not necessarily know whether holding an argument is not
confounded with other attributes (that may not have been measured) such as the
knowledge or experience of the legal representation, or, of course, because of
the merits of the appellant’s case. Instead, all we can say is that holding an
argument was associated with a higher probability of more preferable holdings.
It might seem counterintuitive that ARGHELD and REPLY have different
coefficients for OPINIONRANK and OUTCOMERANK. Holding an argument
and having a reply brief appears to be associated with weaker opinions, but more
preferable overall outcomes. Since most appeals are affirmed, denied, or
dismissed, perhaps weaker OPINIONRANK is actually better (from the
perspective of the appellant), as an indicator that the appellant’s work in
submitting a reply brief and participating in oral argument introduced a seed of
“doubt” in the panel.
It is surprising that lnARGPAGES was included in the stepwise selection
model of OPINIONRANK, despite not being included in either of the models
for HOLDINGRANK or OUTCOMERANK. However, this makes more sense
in the light of the strong positive correlation (r=0.7859, p<0.0001) between
lnNUMSRCS and lnARGPAGES (as well as with lnNUMISSUES and
lnTOTALWDS, see Fig. 1). In general, briefs with a high number of sources
also tend to have a high number of issues, a high number of pages in their
argument, and a high number of total words. In the context of a stepwise
selection, lnARGPAGES (containing some of the variance, or “information,”
associated with the other three variables) was sufficiently explanatory to
improve the AIC of the OPINIONRANK model and be included in the overall
final reduced model.
In fact, since lnNUMSRCS has positive coefficients associated with
HOLDINGRANK and OUTCOMERANK, while lnARGPAGES has a negative
coefficient associated with OPINIONRANK, it would appear that heavily
sourced briefs are associated with more preferable holdings and overall
outcomes, while lengthy arguments are associated with weaker opinions.
This appears to be contrary to the “folk wisdom” of avoiding lengthy or
verbose briefs, but we’ll remind the reader of two things. First, the coefficients
50. Stuart H. Hurlbert, Pseudoreplication and the Design of Ecological Field Experiments, 54
ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 187 (1984).
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associated with lnARGPAGES and lnNUMSRCS are relatively small, meaning
that incremental increases on a natural log scale (or about 2.7-fold increases on
a linear scale) increase the odds of improved holdings (or weakened opinions) a
very small amount. Second, many of the briefs with the greater number of
sources (i.e. over fifty) still have the least preferable holdings or overall
outcomes (Figs. 4, 8), suggesting that it may still be true that a greater number
of sources may be beneficial up to a point, at which an excessive number of
sources may be detrimental.
Perhaps the most important insight that can be drawn from our study is that
the folk wisdom regarding appellate briefs either isn’t indicated, or where it is
indicated, it is only weakly correlated with outcome success. There are,
however, six conclusions that can be drawn based on the statistically significant
relationships we discovered.
First, an increased number of sources cited (up to a point) plus having an
oral argument held is positively correlated with better holdings. This reflects the
folk wisdom that oral arguments are good for appellants but rejects the folk
wisdom that fewer sources are better (which is, to be sure, not an opinion shared
by everyone).
Second, the folk wisdom regarding limiting the number is sources is borne
out where the number of sources is extremely high, which is associated with
worse holdings and overall outcomes.
Third, the folk wisdom that encourages the filing of a reply brief is probably
well-founded but may be less impactful than proponents think. When coupled
with a large number of sources (up to a point) and an oral argument, reply briefs
are associated with better overall outcomes. Specifically, a reply approximately
doubles the odds-ratio of an improved outcome, while holding an argument
increases the odds-ratio of an improved outcome by 6.4-fold.
Fourth, a higher number of argument pages (up to a point) is associated with
weaker opinions, even if this higher number is a proxy for other variables, such
as number of sources cited.
Attorneys should, therefore, take with a healthy grain of salt the advice that
their appellate briefs should reflect the particular quantitative mandates of the
advice-givers. This advice is, at best, weakly correlated with outcome success,
and thus more likely reflects the a priori preferences and assumptions of the
advice-givers.
The data does, however, suggest that attorneys who brief their cases well
and pursue all possible procedural avenues will, all things being equal, fare
better, where briefing a case well means unearthing and utilizing all relevant
sources, and where pursuing all possible procedural avenues means filing a reply
brief and participating in oral argument.
This insight, however, may be limited in two ways. First, appeals that are
well-briefed and engage all possible procedural avenues may be positively
correlated with highly meritorious underlying cases. This makes sense.
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Attorneys are trained to recognize meritorious cases, and may tend to devote
more time and attention to such cases, leading to the use of more sources, the
submission of a reply brief, and participation in oral argument.
Second, appeals that are well-briefed and engage all possible procedural
avenues may be subject to the political preferences of appellate court panels.
Some scholars believe that these preferences inform appellate decision-making
better than any other factor. The correlation, however, between appeals that are
well-briefed and procedurally complete and judges’ political leanings intuitively
seems absent. If politics drives judges’ decision-making, the quality of the brief
and completeness of the procedure shouldn’t be a relevant variable.
The next research step, then, would be to compare the nature of appellate
briefs, as analyzed in this article, with the qualitative merit of the underlying
case. This step would first require the creation of a set of quantifiable variables
that effectively reflects the substantive merit of the underlying case. This set
would comprise the independent variables of this new study. The
HOLDINGRANK, OPINIONRANK, and OUTCOMERANK established in
this article’s study would comprise the dependent variables. The insight gleaned
from this proposed study could be valuable in itself. The second step, then,
would be to ask whether there is a positive correlation between the relevant
variables for appellate briefs established in our current study with the relevant
variables established in this second proposed study. The outcome of this
comparison should reveal whether the quality of appellate briefs increases or
decreases the odds of outcome success, whether or not the underlying case is
relatively meritorious or non-meritorious.
* * *
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APPENDIX A: CODEBOOK
CASENUM:

NUMSRCS:

NUMISSUES:

WDSPERISS:

STMTPAGES:

Provides the Eighth Circuit’s assigned case number (ex.:
16-1907). If the case lists more than one case number, the
first listed case number is used. If that case does not permit
access to the briefs or if the appellant’s brief is otherwise
unavailable via PACER, “Briefs unavail” is entered under
NUMSRCS. If the brief is pro se, “Pro se” is entered under
NUMSRCS. If the brief is an Anders brief and the court
affirmed, finding no non-frivolous issues, dismissed the
appeal, or otherwise made no dispositive ruling,
“AndersAff” is entered under NUMSRCS.
The total number of sources cited in the brief (taking by
counting all of the sources in the Table of Authorities
section).
20=20
30=30
35=35
Etc.
The number of issues the appellant asserts, as set forth in
the statement of issues (determined by counting the formal
number of issues the appellant argues. Does not account
for multiple issues within each formal issue).
1=1
2=2
3=3
Etc.
The average number of words per issue statement (taken
by adding all of the words in the issue statements in the
Statement of the Issue(s) section, and dividing by the total
NUMISSUES).
20=20
30=30
35=35
Etc.
The total number of pages in the statement of the case
(taken by subtracting the page number on which the
statement of the case starts from the page number on which
the statement of the case ends). Where there is a separate
“statement of the case” and “statement of the facts”
section, the page numbers for both sections are counted.
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TOTALWDS:

REPLY:
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2=2
4=4
7=7
Etc.
The total number of pages in the argument (taken by
subtracting the page number on which the argument starts
from the page number on which the argument ends).
2=2
4=4
7=7
Etc.
The average number of pages per issue in the argument
(taking by dividing ARGPAGES by NUMISSUES).
2=2
4=4
7=7
Etc.
The total number of words in the entire brief (as provided
in the certificate of compliance). If the total number of
words is listed as “less than xxx,” xxx is entered. Thus, if
counsel certifies that the brief is “less than 4,000 words,”
4,000 is entered. Where the length of the brief is described
in page numbers rather than words, that number is
multiplied by 230. If the brief’s count is by line numbers,
multiply that number by 13.
5000=5000
10000=10000
15000=15000
Etc.
Did the appellant file a Reply Brief (found on the Eighth
Circuit’s general docket sheet for each page)? If the
original brief was submitted by counsel, but the reply brief
was pro se, 2 is entered.
1 = Yes
2 = No
Did the Eighth Circuit hold an oral argument (found on the
Eighth Circuit’s general docket sheet for each page)?
1 = Yes
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2 = No (includes an initial determination of no argument
and an initial set argument later cancelled by the
Court)
OPINION:
What type of opinion was issued (found on the Eighth
Circuit’s general docket sheet)? Ranked as
OPINIONRANK.
1 = Per curiam
2 = Signed, unanimous
3 = Signed, with concurrence
4 = Signed, with dissent
5 = Memorandum
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent (includes
concurrences in part and dissents in part)
HOLDING:
What was the court’s holding (found on the Eighth
Circuit’s general docket sheet)
(note: these code variables are taken from the Appellate
Court Database)? Ranked as HOLDINGRANK
0 = Stay, petition, or motion granted
1 = Affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
2 = Reversed (include reversed and vacated)
3 = Reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
4 = Vacated and remanded (also set aside and remanded;
modified and remanded)
5 = Affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or
affirmed and modified)
6 = Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded;
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
7 = Vacated
8 = Petition denied or appeal dismissed
9 = Certification to another court
10 = Not ascertained
OUTCOMERANK: A ranked combination of HOLDING and OPINION:
1 = Per curiam reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated;
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=1 and
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7);
2 = Signed, unanimous reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated;
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=2 and
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7);
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3 = Signed, with concurrence reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated;
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=3 and
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7);
4 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent reversed; reversed and
remanded/vacated; vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded
(where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7);
5 = Signed, with dissent reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated;
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=4 and
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7);
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part and reversed in part (where OPINION=1
and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=2 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=3 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part and reversed in
part (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part and reversed in part (where
OPINION=4 and HOLDING=5);
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (where
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=6);
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=6);
7 = Signed, with dissent affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=1 or 8);
8 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmance, petition denied, or
appeal dismissed (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=1 or 8);
9 = Signed, with concurrence affirmance, petition denied, or appeal
dismissed (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=1 or 8);
10 = Signed, unanimous affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=1 or 8);
11 = Per curiam affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed (where
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=1 or 8).
* * *
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